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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs, 
CASEY NEAL SWEAT, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20718 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts are as set 
forth previously in Appellant's Brief (Brief of Appellant at 1-2). 
The Appellant takes this opportunity to reply to the Respondent's 
Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS APPEAL IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS 
COURT AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
CONSIDERING ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL 
MISCONDUCT IN IMPOSING SENTENCE. 
The Appellant in his opening brief contended that the trial 
court erred in considering allegations of sexual misconduct contained 
in the presentence report in imposing sentence. The allegations 
were unsupported and uncharged. No effort was made by the court 
or the prosecution to substantiate the allegations. The Appellant 
was prejudicied by the inclusion of the allegations in the report 
because without the allegations, the Appellant may have received 
probation or commitment to a treatment program. 
In response to this contention the State, in its brief, has 
asserted that the appeal should be dismissed for procedural reasons 
(Respondent's Brief at 3-6) and that the trial court's reliance 
on the allegations would have been proper or, at the worst, harm-
less error (Respondent's Brief at 6-15). As will be shown below, 
the State's first assertion is groundless and the second assertion 
is meritless. 
A. THIS APPEAL SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED 
FOR PROCEDURAL REASONS. 
In arguing that this Court should not reach of the merits 
of this appeal, the State first claims that a specific and timely 
objection was not made in the district court (Respondent's Brief 
at 3). In fact, even a cursory examination of the transcript of 
the sentencing proceeding reveals that fully one-half of that 
proceeding involved a discussion between the attorneys and the judge 
concerning the propriety of the inclusion of the uncharged allegations 
in the presentence report. (T.2-5) (Addendum A ) . 
Specifically, the following exchange occurred at the beginning 
of the proceedings: 
THE COURT: Is there any legal reason, Ms. 
Carter, that sentence should not be imposed? 
MS. CARTER (Attorney for Defendant): I'm not 
sure if it's a legal reason, Your Honor, but 
Casey mentioned this to me the other day and 
I forgot. He brought it up. He's willing to 
take a ploygraph test if that would aid the 
Court in making the decision as to what to 
do with him. I know there is quite a discrep-
ancy between what the victim said and what 
Casey said. (T.2) 
Further, the following was stated: 
MR. BLAYLOCK (the Prosecutor): About the 
only thing I could, Your Honor, I think we'll 
submit it on the 90-day evaluation with the 
recommendation. 
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MS. CARTER: Your Honor, let me raise 
this then as a legal issue for the 
Court to rule on. 
I am concerned about the information 
the Court is receiving as to circumstances 
that do not relate to a burglary charge. 
Now, I realize that they may fall under a 
category of the total circumstances of 
what occurrred, but I am concerned about 
the Court receiving really hearsay state-
ments from the County Attorney's Office as 
to other allegations of misconduct that 
Casey did not plead to, and then consider-
ing those in terms of sentencing, that is 
clearly what the 90-day evaluation people 
did as well. 
So, I would raise that to the Court. 
I'm not quite sure how to couch it, but it 
seems to me that it is not really possible 
for us except to verbally now rebut any of 
that or state what Casey recalls happening. 
So, I would raise that as an issue to the 
Court. (T.3-4) 
Both counsel were plainly discussing the erroneous allegations 
contained in the presentence report. In fact, immediately follow-
ing this exchange, the prosecutor discussed at some length why the 
court should consider all of the presentence report in making the 
sentencing decision (T.4-5). Finally, defense counsel stated that 
Mr. Sweat "does not believe that he did any of the sexual misconduct 
that has been alluded to in the presentence report." (T.6) 
In State v. Leseley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983), this Court 
noted that the purpose of a timely and specific objection was to 
alert a trial court to problems concerning the admissibility of 
evidence so that the court will have the "opprotunity to avoid 
error." Id., at 82. In this case, a thorough reading of the tran-
script can only lead to the conclusion that the trial court was made 
fully aware of the problems with the presentence report and was 
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given ample "opportunity to avoid error." 
The State further claims that this appeal should be dis-
missed because "nothing in the record suggests that the district 
court rejected any defense argument or relied upon information 
which defendant sought to exclude." (Respondent's Brief at 5). 
In fact, the record undermines this statement. Just before impos-
ing sentence, the trial judge stated: 
THE COURT: Well, taking all of the 
considerations, taking everything into 
consideration I don't see any legal reason 
why sentencing cannot be imposed at this 
time. Therefore, I'm going to impose 
sentence as follows: . . . (T.7) 
The district court relied on the entire 90-day evaluation/presentence 
report in imposing sentence. The State's claims that the appeal 
should be dismissed on procedural grounds are clearly unsuported 
by the record. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING 
ERRONEOUS, UNSUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS 
OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT IN IMPOSING 
SENTENCE. 
The State's brief lists two substantives reasons why the 
Appellant's sentence was properly imposed. First, the State asserts 
that the district court would have committed no error in consider-
ing all of the information in the presentence report including the 
allegations of sexual misconduct. (Respondent's Brief at 6-13). 
In presenting this assertion, the State relies on several cases 
which it says stand for the proposition "that a sentencing judge 
may consider evidence that is extraneous to the precise allegations 
or offenses set forth in the charging document." (Respondent's 
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Brief at 6). However, not one of the cases cited by the State 
states that a sentencing court may rely on unfounded, uncharged 
allegations of criminal misconduct in imposing sentence. 
The State can produce no case which counters the contention 
outlined in Appellant's Brief that the accused is entitled to have 
a judge rely on accurate information in imposing sentence. 
(Appellant's Brief at 4). Indeed, in State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 
1241, 1249 (Utah 1980), this Court stated: "The fair administration 
of justice at the least requires that the information upon which 
the judge relies in imposing punishment is accurate." This position 
was reaffirmed in State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985), in 
which this Court stated: "The due process clause of Article I, 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, requires that sentencing judge 
act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising 
discretion in fixing sentence." Any sentence which is based, in 
part, on unreliabile information must be remanded. United States 
v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652 (2nd Cir. 1973); United States v. Weston, 
448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971); State v. Gibson, 681 P.2d 1 (Idaho 
App. 1984). 
In this case, the presentence report contained allegations 
of significant sexual misconduct on the part of Mr. Sweat. However, 
the allegations were in the form of unsubstantiated, second hand 
reports from the victim who took several days to report the alleged 
sexual misconduct. The allegations were apparently insufficient 
to support the instigation of criminal charges. (Appellant's Brief 
at 5-7). Such unsubstantiated claims are far from the "accurate 
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information" envisioned by Lipsky and Howell. 
Finally, the State asserts that even if the trial judge 
improperly relied on the erroneous allegations, such reliance 
constituted only harmless error. (Respondent's Brief at 13-15). 
One need look no further than the presentence report itself to see 
that such reliance by the judge would be anything but harmless. 
The presentence report investigator recommended commitment to the 
Utah State Prison. (Appellant's Brief, Addendum A at 9). Immediate-
ly proceeding this recommendation is a discussion of the defendant's 
"sexual attacks upon the elderly woman." Id. On the other hand, 
a psychologist, who had no knowledge of the sexual misconduct 
allegations, recommended that the defendant be placed in a substance 
abuse treatment facility. (Appellant's Brief, Addendum D at 2). 
Clearly, the judge's reliance on the erroneous allegations led him 
to the conclusion of the presentence report investigator rather 
than the conclusion of the psychologist. The Appellant was 
obviously harmed by such a conclusion. 
Sentencing in felony cases in this state can result in the 
second-most severe penalty that a state can impose—deprivation of 
an individual's liberty for a significant length of time. Only 
the penalty of death is more severe. In light of the severity of 
the penalty, the issue in this case is simple: Should this Court 
require a sentencing judge to act only on information that is 
accurate, reliable, and trustworthy? The alternative is to allow 
a judge to impose sentence based on innuendo, rumor, and falsehood. 
To allow the latter would gut the notion of due process at the 
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sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the trial court's misplaced reliance on unsub-
stantiated allegations contained in the presentence report, the 
Appellant requests that this Court remand his case for redetermin-
ation of his sentence. 
Respectfully submitted this day of March, 1986. 
CURTIS C. NESSET 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, CURTIS C. NESSET, attorney for appellant, hereby 
certify that four copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant 
have been delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this day of 
March, 1986. 
CURTIS C. NESSET 
Attorney for Appellant 
Delivered by this day of March, 
1986. 
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ADDENDUM A 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, MAY 13, 1985; 9:00 A.M. 
. P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: STATE OF UTAH VERSUS CASEY 
NEAL SWEAT, CR 85-113. 
THE DEFENDANT IS PRESENT AND REPRESENTED BY 
MS. CARTER AND THE STATE OF UTAH IS REPRESENTED BY MR. 
BLAYLOCK. 
THIS IS THE TIME SET FOR SENTENCING IN THIS 
MATTER. 
IS THERE ANY LEGAL REASON, MS. CARTER, THAT 
SENTENCE SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED? 
MS. CARTER: I'M NOT SURE IF IT'S A 
LEGAL REASON, YOUR HONOR, BUT CASEY MENTIONED THIS TO ME THE 
OTHER DAY AND I FORGOT. HE BROUGHT IT UP. HE'S WILLING TO 
TAKE A POLYGRAPH TEST IF THAT WOULD AID THE COURT IN MAKING 
THE DECISION AS TO WHAT TO DO WITH HIM. I KNOW THERE IS 
QUITE A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WHAT THE VICTIM SAID AND WHAT 
CASEY SAID. 
AS I EXPLAINED TO THE COU«?T IN CHAMBERS, I AM 
VERY CONCERNED ABOUT IT BECAUSE WEDIDN'TDO THE PRELIMINARY 
HEARING. WE DIDN'T HAVE THAT INFORMATION AT THAT TIME AND 
I WOULD NOT ADVISE CASEY TO CHANGE WHAT WE HAVE DONE HERE. 
I DON'T KNOW WHETHER HE HAS ANY DESIRE TO DO THAT. THAT WOULC) 
NOT BE MY ADVICE TO HIM. 
HE DID MENTION TO ME SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE 
2 
1 PAST WEEK THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH TEST 
2 IF THE COURT ORDERED IT, 
3 THE COURT: WELL, THE COURT WOULD NOT 
4 ORDER SUCH A TEST IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT A GUILTY PLEA 
5 HAS BEEN ENTERED. THAT WOULD MEAN THAT A MOTION WOULD HAVE 
6 TO BE FILED TO SET ASIDE A GUILTY PLEA, AND THEN I THINK WE 
7 I HAVE TO RENEW THE WHOLE PROCESS, 
MR. BLAYLOCK, DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY WITH 
9 | REGARDS TO THIS? 
MR. BLAYLOCK! ABOUT THE ONLY THING 1 
COULD SAY, YOUR HONOR, I THINK WE'LL SUBMIT IT ON THE 
90-DAY EVALUATION WITH THE RECOMMENDATION, 
MS. CARTER: YOUR HONOR, LET ME RAISE 
THIS THEN AS A LEGAL ISSUE FOR THE COURT TO RULE ON. 
I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE INFORMATION THE COURT 
IS RECEIVING AS TO CIRCUMSTANCES THAT DO NOT RELATE TO A 
17 I BURGLARY CHARGE. NOW, I REALIZE THAT THEY MAY FALL UNDER 
18 A CATAGORY OF THE TOTAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF WHAT OCCURRED, BUT 
19 I I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE COURT RECEIVING REALLY HEARSAY 
STATEMENTS FROM THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE AS TO OTHER 
21 I ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT THAT CASEY DID NOT PLEAD TO, AND 
22 I THEN CONSIDERING THOSE IN TERMS OF SENTENCING. THAT IS 
23 I CLEARLY WHAT THE 90-DAY EVALUATION PEOPLE DID AS WELL. 
24 SO, I WOULD RAISE THAT TO THE COURT. I'M NOT 
25 J QUITE SURE HOW TO COUCH IT, BUT IT SEEMS. TO ME THAT IT IS NO 
8 
 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
REALLY POSSIBLE FOR US EXCEPT TO VERBALLY NOW REBUT ANY OF 
THAT OR STATE WHAT CASEY RECALLS HAPPENING. SO, I WOULD 
RAISE THAT AS AN ISSUE TO THE COURT. 
THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY 
IN RESPONSE TO THAT, MR. BLAYLOCK? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I THINK THAT THE STATUTE 
IS CLEAR, AND ALSO THE CASES, THAT THE COURT CAN CONSIDER 
EXTRANEOUS EVIDENCE THAT WOULDN'T BE PERMISSIBLE IN A TRIAL 
AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING, AND THAT IT CAN ALSO LOOK AT 
BACKGROUND AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OFFENSE AND 
THE MANNER IN WHICH THE OFFENSE IS COMMITTED, THE ATTITUDE 
OF THE DEFENDANT AND SO FORTH. 
I THINK THOSE ARE BASICALLY WHAT THE PRE-
SENTENCE PEOPLE DO, THE 90-DAY EVALUATION ADDRESSES. SO, 
I THINK THOSE ARE ALL APPROPRIATE COMMENTS TO THE COURT AND 
THEY PUT THE COURT IN THE PICTURE AS TO WHAT THE COMPLETE 
CIRCUMSTANCES WERE. 
I DON'T THINK THE FACT THAT AN INDIVIDUAL PLEAD 
TO A SPECIFIC COUNT, IF WHETHER IT'S THE POLICE OR VICTIM OR 
ANYBODY THAT IS FAMILIAR WITH THE VICTIM MAKING THAT KIND 
OF A STATEMENT -- PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT 
LEGISLATIVE ACTS THAT SPEAK TO THINGS LIKE VICTIM IMPACT 
STATEMENTS, THINGS OF THAT NATURE. THOSE ARE VERY IMPORTANT 
FOR THE SENTENCING JUDGE TO UNDERSTAND, THE KINDS OF IMPACT 
THAT A CRIME HAS HAD ON A VICTIM. 
«t 
THAT SPECIFICALLY IS WHAT WE ARE LOOKING AT 
HERE, AND I BELIEVE THAT SPECIFICALLY IS WHAT COUNSEL IS 
TALKING ABOUT. HE ENTERED A PLEA TO A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, 
BUT WHAT OCCURRED HAD A MUCH GREATER IMPACT ON THE VICTIM 
BECAUSE THERE WERE OTHER THINGS INVOLVED. I THINK IT WAS 
ALL APPROPRIATE AND ALL THE COMMENTS IN THE EVALUATION ARE 
APPROPRIATE. I THINK THEY'RE APPROPRIATE FOR THIS COURT TO 
REVIEW IN DETERMINING A SENTENCE FOR THE CRIME, AND THE 
RECOMMENDATION MADE BY THE 90-DAY EVALUATION UNIT IS 
APPROPRIATE, 
MS, CARTER: YOUR HONOR, I WILL SUBMIT 
THE LEGAL ISSUE, BUT WE DO HAVE FURTHER COMMENTS. 
THE COURT: WELL, I WILL THINK ABOUT IT. 
YOU MAY GO AHEAD AND MAKE YOUR OTHER COMMENTS. 
MS. CARTER: WHAT I WOULD SAY, AND I 
SAID A LOT OF THIS LAST WEEK SO I WON'T BE TOO REPETITIOUS, 
IS THAT CASEY DID NOT FAIR WELL ON THE 90-DAY. THE 90-DAY 
l< SORT OF A LAST CHANCE EFFORT, AND I REALIZE THAT, BUT I 
THINK SOME OF WHAT OCCURRED DURING THE 90-DAY WAS THAT 
APSP RECEIVED THIS EXTRA INFORMATION. CASEY HAS A SEVERE 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROBLEM, YOUR HONOR, AND THAT HAS BEEN MY 
BIGGEST CONCERN ALL ALONG. 
I THINK CASEY NEEDS" HELP WITH THAT AND I'M NOT 
SURE HE WILL GET THAT KIND OF HELP AT THE PRISON. THAT IS, 
TO ME, THE ROOT OF WHAT THE PROBLEM IS. WHATEVER DID OCCUR, 
5 
I THINK THAT IS WHAT TRIGGERS THIS ACTIVITY BY CASEY, 
WHETHER IT'S A BURGLARY OR ANYTHING ELSE, AND I THINK THAT 
HE NEEDS HELP WITH THAT. 
CASEY REMEMBERS GOING THERE, GOING IN, AND HE 
REMEMBERS WHEN HE USED THE TELEPHONE. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE 
THAT HE DID ANY OF THE SEXUAL MISCONDUCT THAT HAS BEEN 
ALLUDED TO IN THE PRESENTENCE REPORT. HE FEELS BADLY ABOUT 
WHAT HE DID. HE IS NOT TRYING TO EXCUSE GOING IN THERE. 
THAT WAS WRONG. HE REALIZES THAT THE VICTIM WAS VERY MUCH 
TERRORIZED BY HIS GOING IN THERE AND THAT THAT CAN'T BE 
TOLERATED AND THAT IT WAS WRONG OF HIM TO DO THAT; BUT 
CASEY DOES HAVE A SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROBLEM. HE WOULD NOT 
HAVE GONE THERE, YOUR HONOR, IF HE HAD NOT BEEN VERY DRUNK. 
I WOULD URGE THE COURT TO CONSIDER ANYTHING 
BESIDES PRISON THAT WOULD DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM. 
I THINK MAYBE CASEY WOULD LIKE TO SAY SOMETHING 
TO THE COURT. 
THE DEFENDANT: I WOULD LIKE TO GET 
ALCOHOL TREATMENT, YOUR HONOR. I KNOW THAT THAT WOULD 
NEVER HAVE HAPPENED IF I WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN DRINKING. I 
KNOW f SHOULDN'T HAVE BEEN DRINKING, BUT I DID, AND I WENT 
TO THE HOUSE TO USE THE TELEPHONE -- ALL MY INTENT TO DO, 
AND I'M VERY SOPRY FOR WHAT HAPPENED. NOT BECAUSE I GOT 
CAUGHT, I'M JUST SORRY FOR WHAT HAPPENED. 
THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER?! 
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MS. CARTER: NO, YOUR HONOR. WE WOULD 
SUBMIT IT. 
THE COURT: WELL, TAKING ALL OF THE 
CONSIDERATIONS, TAKING EVERYTHING INTO CONSIDERATION I DON'T 
SEE ANY LEGAL REASON WHY SENTENCE CANNOT BE IMPOSED AT THIS 
TIME. THEREFORE, I'M GOING TO IMPOSE SENTENCE AS FOLLOWS: 
YOU WILL BE CONFINED IN UTAH STATE PRISON FOR 
AN INDETERMINATE ONE TO FIFTEEN YEARS, AND IT IS GOING TO 
BE THE FURTHER RECOMMENDATION OF THIS COURT THAT THE PRISON 
ALLOW YOU TO TAKE WHATEVER MEANS THAT THEY HAVE THERE TO 
RESOLVE YOUR DRUG PROBLEM, IF THEY HAVE IT. IF NOT, THEN 
I DON'T KNOW WHAT MORE I CAN DO IN YOUR BEHALF. 
I WOULD LIKE TO HELP YOU OUT, BUT ON THE OTHER 
HAND I'M SURE WITH YOUR PROBLEM THAT YOU SHOULDN'T BE OUT 
ON THE STREETS EITHER AT THIS TIME. 
SO THAT RECOMMENDATION WILL BE MADE TO THE 
PRJSON AUTHORITIES, THAT THEY PLACE YOU IN SOME TYPE OF DRUG 
REHABILITATION PROGRAM WHILE YOU'RE OUT THERE AT THE PRISON. 
I THINK THAT CAN POSSIBLY BE DONE. SO THAT WILL BE THE 
SENTENCE AT THIS TIME. 
FURTHER SENTENCE, I FAILED TO MENTION THAT THERBj 
IS A $35 RESTITUTION. HE WILL HAVE TO PAY THAT ALSO. THAT 
WILL BE THE ORDER OF THE COURT, THAT HE PAY THAT $35 
RESTUITION TO THE VICTIM. 
--0O0--
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